Melba Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake County et al : Brief of Defendants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Melba Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake County
et al : Brief of Defendants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. L. Schoenhals; Attorney for Defendants;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wilcox v. District Court of Salt Lake County, No. 8114 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2133
Civil No. 8114 
IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MELBA WILCOX, executrix of the 
Estate of Don E. Wilcox, Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE 
JOSEPH G. JEPPSON, District 
Judge and EDNA ABBOTT 
WILCOX, 
Defendants . 
... < ..... 
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BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS , 
E. L. SCHOENHALS 
Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MELBA WILCOX, executrix of the 
Estate of Don E. Wilcox, Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE 
JOSEPH G. JEPPSON, District 
Judge and EDKA ABBOTT 
\VILCOX, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
FACTS 
Civil No. 
8114 
There is no question before this court with respect 
to the service of process. Process had been completed. 
The court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the 
persons. This is a proceeding supplemental to or subse-
quent to process to wit: an order to show cause after the 
court has jurisdiction. Plaintiff and defendants do not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
dispute this point. The only question is, did the death of 
the defendant invalidate process and cause an abate-
Inent of the action requiring process to be again served 
upon the executrix. 
ANS\VER TO POINT I 
In V tah an action and proceedings therein under do 
not abate upon death. 
This is not the comrnencement of an action. Plaintiff 
concedes the action was commenced in 1928, and that the 
court had jurisdiction of the persons, of the subject mat-
ter and the matrimonial res. 
vVhy does plaintiff cite Pennoyer v. Neff which case 
involves only the issue of the commencement of an action 
by service of a summons on a non resident. Had Edna 
Abbott commenced an action after death which is not the 
case, and served process, Pennoyer v. Neff would have 
application and defendants concede the rationale under 
such circumstances. 
The other citations submitted by opposing counsel 
all concern the commencement of an action, and not the 
substitution of a personal representative in an action 
when the court not only has jurisdiction but statutory 
authority to maintain contin'lling jurisdiction with re-
spect thereto. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
REPLY FNDER AF·FIH1IATIYE DEFE~SE 
POINT I OF DEFENDANTS ON REPLY 
WHERE THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THE 
PARTIES AND THE SUBJECT MATTER AND IS GRANTED 
POWER BY THE LEGISLATURE TO RETAIN ·CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION FOR SUBSEQUENT ACTION, REMOVAL 
FROM THE STATE OR DEATH DOES NOT DIVEST THE 
COURT OF JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO SUBSE-
QUENT PROCEEDINGS AND ONLY SUCH NOTICE AS 
MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY THE COURT IS NECESSARY TO 
BIND THE PARTIES OR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IF 
A PARTY DIES. 
This is not the cmnmencement of an action, it is pro-
eeedings subsequent to jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter, matrimonial res, and persons. 
This is the same question as where process has is-
sued and parties have submitted to the jurisdiction, the 
issue;-; drawn and then defendant has n10ved out of the 
jurisdiction. X ow, must plaintiff again serve defendant 
with process, or is service of a notice of hearing all that 
is necessary~ 
vVhen an order to show cause is issued after juris-
diction of the person is acquired Rule 65 A (b) require:-: 
only notice to the party of the hearing. 
Rule 5 B (1) prescribes notice to be sufficient merely 
hy mailing or serving the same upon a party or his at-
torney. The rule also gives the court discretion to pre-
f'crih' notice hy service upon a party. 
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In the case at bar the court exercised discretion and 
ordered that service of a copy of the order on executrix 
would be sufficient. This matter is res adjudicata. The 
Rule gives the court DISCRETION to do this. Can the 
plaintiff under this extraordinary writ seek to restrain 
the trial court from acting on a discretionary matter¥ 
The maxim of the law that lower courts will not be sub-
jected to action on extraordinary \vrits where the lower 
court is in exercise of a discretionary function has been 
ignored by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff by appearing admits notice was given in 
the trial court. Plaintiff also conceded in the trial court 
that had defendant Wilcox survived, and had he been 
served with notice, though outside the state, he would be 
bound by proceedings had pursuant to notice in the case 
at bar. Plaintiff having conceded this counsel shall not 
burden the court with authorities. 
Plaintiff claims that death of Wilcox changes the 
situation. The authorities and statutes do not sustain 
such position. Plaintiff has cited no authority which re-
quires the commencement anew of an action by service of 
process where the defendant dies. None can be found and 
the statutes and authorities do not so hold. 
75-11-5 UCA, 1953 permits the maintenance of ac-
tions against decedents the same as they might be main-
tained against the testate. :Moreover, rule 25 (a) ( 1) pro-
vides: 
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"If a party dies and the clain1 is not thereby 
extinguished, the court upon application n1ade 
within two years after the death, shall order sub-
::;titution of the proper parties. The nwtion for 
substitution 1nay be made by * * * any party." 
The legislature having spoken, it follows that the 
appointment of an executrix and the substitution with 
notice has supplied the only iten1 necessary to provide 
continuing jurisdiction over the personal representative, 
whether the defendant Wilcox was alive or dead. Such 
application was made within two years after death. 
30-3-5 rCA, 1953 with respect to divorce actions has 
heen construed to give the court continuing jurisdiction 
over the persons upon death and to extend beyond the 
person and include the personal representative upon 
death of defendant and also the subject matter and the 
properties of the defendant or his estate, and to even 
permit the party plaintiff to pursue in a divorce action a 
judgment against the substituted administrator, and to 
determine on an order to show cause not only the amount 
of the judgment but to also require payment directly 
fron1 the estate to a plaintiff in a divorce action and fore-
closure of a lien. See·: 
111urphy v. Moyle, 53 P. 1010, 17 U. 113. 
Please also note in the above case th·at Section 2606 
upon which the court at 17 Utah, page 120 claims author-
ity to interfere in the administration of the estate is 
precisely the same as our section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953. 
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The fiction of custodia legis extended to administra-
tors has no application where the parties have already 
submitted their matrimonial res and themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the court or voluntary vest the court with 
jurisdiction over themselves and such of their property 
a:-; the court may determine necessary for child support. 
The courts attention is invited to section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 
1953, wherein the court is expressly given jurisdiction 
of the property of the parties and a continuing jurisdic-
tion thereof. Mnr]Jhy v. Moyle, supra, is the same as the 
case at bar in that it vvas a divorce action with substitu-
tion of the administrator and an order to show cause. 
i\[oreover, the authorities in other jurisdiction sustain 
the position taken in the Murphy v. Moyle case: See 2 
Bancrofts Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, page 556, per-
mitting the substitution in pending action of the deced-
ents representative. 
2.1 CJS 113-114. 
"A nonresident over whose person jurisdic-
tion has been acquired is in court for every pur-
pose connected with the suit, and is charged with 
notice of any action the court 1nay take pending 
the same; and having acquired jurisdiction, the 
court will retain it for the purpose of adminis-
tering justice to resident citizens, and will not 
send th~m to foreign jurisdictions to seek re-
dress." 
Here defendant seeks to send plaintiff in the court below 
to California. 
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:21 CJS 144. 
''So, where jurisdiction of the person or of 
the res has once attached, it is not defeated hy a 
re1noval of the person or the res beyond the juris-
diction of the court." 
The matrimonial res and res necessary for support of 
the minor child attached by consent in the case at bar. 
:21 CJS 1-!G. 
"'The court does not necessarily lose jurisdic-
tion by the death of some of the petitioners, and 
a statute may authorize continuation of the action, 
as by the substitution of a representative of the 
decedent." 
:27 CJS 652. 
"Where a nonresident defendant appears and 
answers and all other elements of jurisdiction are 
present in general the court has jurisdiction for 
all purposes." 
27 CJS 1225. 
''\Vhere a divorce decree becomes absolute, 
the court nevertheless retains jurisdiction of 
the subject matter so far as to compel compliance 
with the decree as to the maintenance and support 
of minor children." 
27 CJS 1239. 
"The decree may also be amended to give the 
provisions for the ehild's 1naintenance the effect 
of a lien on the deceased father's estate, with 
priority over the right of the widow and heirs." 
'-Ve have not asked for this, only determination of the 
sum due. 
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27 CJS 1248. 
"Time of making application. The jurisdic-
tion of the court being continuous, statutes limit-
ing the time within which judgments may be modi-
fied have no application to the modification of 
divorce decrees awarding a sum for the support 
of minor children." 
West vs. West) 217 N.W. 925. 
"So solicitous is the law for the welfare of 
the child that the decree for such support sur-
vives the death of the father and may be amended 
to give the provision for the child's maintenance 
the effect of a lien upon the estate with priority 
over rights of the widow and heirs." 
15 ALR 629. 
"In White vs. White (1903) 65 N.J. Eq. 741, 
55 Atl. 739, it is held that where a court has 
acquired jurisdiction over a defendant in divorce 
proceedings it retains jurisdiction for the purpose 
of subsequent proceedings to alter the amount 
paid to plaintiff for the maintenance of the chil-
dren, in accordance with the terms of the decree 
providing for such alteration; and that the court 
umy use its discretion in prescribing the meas-
ures necessary to notify the defendant of such 
proceedings. And where personal service is pre-
scribed b~~ the court, it is immaterial that it is 
served tcitho'Ut the state. 
It is apparent that other courts recognize it is a 
discretionary n1atter with the court to prescribe notice. 
I 
~ 
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What is plaintiff doing before this court on an extra-
ordinary writ~ 
Let the writ be dismissed and the· lower court 
directed to proceed to determination as prayed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
E. L. SCHOENHALS, 
Attorney for Defendants. 
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